On structural sources of the 1994 Turkish crisis: a CGE modelling analysis by Yeldan, A.E.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=cira20
Download by: [Bilkent University] Date: 27 October 2017, At: 06:19
International Review of Applied Economics
ISSN: 0269-2171 (Print) 1465-3486 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cira20
On Structural Sources of the 1994 Turkish Crisis: a
CGE modelling analysis
A. Erinç Yeldan
To cite this article: A. Erinç Yeldan (1998) On Structural Sources of the 1994 Turkish Crisis:
a CGE modelling analysis, International Review of Applied Economics, 12:3, 397-414, DOI:
10.1080/02692179800000015
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02692179800000015
Published online: 28 Jul 2006.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 66
View related articles 
Citing articles: 6 View citing articles 
International Review of Applied Economics, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1998 397 
On Structural Sources of the 1994 Turkish Crisis: a 
CGE modelling analysis 
A. ERINC YELDAN 
ABSTRACT This paper investigates the impact of the Turkish public sector imbalances 
on the evolution of the economic crisis during 1990-93. A computable general equilibrium 
model is used. The theoretical basis of the model rests upon the structuralisdKeynesian 
macro foundations. Its distinguishing features entail accommodation of oligopolistic 
mark-up pricing rules in the industrial sectors, and endogenous solution of capacity 
utilisation and unemployment levels through Keynesian mechanisms of effective final 
demand. The results of the model underscore the ;;nportance of intra-class relations of 
income distribution and conflict in the evolution of price movements in the Turkish 
economy. It is further argued that the sources of the crisis lie in the administrative 
interventions of the state towards protection of the capitalist and rural incomes, which 
would otherwise be squeezed out in favour of wage-labour in the early 1990s. 
1. Introduction 
Beginning in January 1994, the Turkish economy suffered a major financial crisis 
which was followed by real contraction. Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
declined by more than 5% over the year, with the inflation rate soaring to almost 
150°/o, and the number of unemployed increasing by at least 600 000. Concur- 
rently, the pace of capital accumulation, both public and private, severely 
contracted, while the trade deficit rose to unprecedented levels. By the end of 
1994, the stock of domestic debt rose to 20% of GDP, from 2.4% only four years 
before. Interest payments on domestic debt emerged as a major category of 
distribution, squeezing out the non-financial claims on aggregate value added. 
By 1995, the GDP recovered and the major thrust of the crisis seemed to have 
been overcome. However, as of mid-1997 the repercussions of the crisis are still 
being felt, with annual price inflation running at 85-90% (the highest in the 
OECD); the trade deficit reaching US$ 20 billion; and the public sector borrowing 
requirement (PSBR) at 7% of the GDP. 
The main indicators of this period are summarised in Table 1. It can easily be 
seen that the growth performance of the post-1990 Turkish economy was one of 
mini boom-and-bust cycles. The gross domestic product fluctuated widely with 
rates of growth recording sharp peaks (9.3% in 1990, 8.0% in 1993 and 7.3% in 
1995) to be followed by severe contractions in the immediate aftermath (0.9% in 
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398 A. E. Yeldan 
1991, - 5.4% in 1994). The cyclical pattern is observed to be closely related to 
the 'external gap' (Taylor, 1996, 1994). In general, high growth years were 
associated with the availability of external finance to cover the current account 
deficits and expansion of imports. The ongoing import liberalisation led to a faster 
rise in imports than exports, which by 1990, had already lost their thrust of the 
1980s. 
The period was also characterised by a rapid deterioration of the fiscal 
position of the state (Sak et al., 1996; Atiyas, 1995; IBoratav et al., 1996; Onder et 
al., 1993). As Table 1 shows, the major breakdown occurred in the flow of net 
factor income generated by the state economic enterprise system, and in the rapid 
rise of the transfer expenditures. The major cause of this phenomenon was the 
sudden increase in real wage costs, fuelled by political-economy pressures of the 
civilian elections of 1989 and 1990. In manufacturing, real wages rose by 18.5% 
in 1990, and by 64.9% in 199 1. Factor revenues declined by T L  4.6 trillion in real 
1987 values over a period of four years from 1988 to 1992. Even though there had 
been modest improvements in tax revenues, the surge in transfer expenditures 
overran such gains. As a ratio of GNP, current transfers rose from 6.1% in 1991, 
to 12.0% in 1994. Likewise, the saving generation capacity of the public sector was 
eroded severely and turned negative after 1992. The aggregate disposable income 
of the public sector fell by 30% in real terms between 1988-95, and the public 
saving-investment gap widened by almost fourfold. 
All these developments led to a sharp increase in the public sector borrowing 
requirement, which increased to 11.7% of the GNP in 1993, just before the 
outbreak of the 1994 economic crisis. The state resorted to a massive operation of 
domestic debt financing by way of new issues of debt instruments and imple- 
mented both market and administrative (non-market) mechanisms to attain the 
necessary resources for financing its fiscal operations. The government debt 
instruments dominated the financial markets. In 1995, the share of new issues of 
public securities stood at 90% of the total; and the share of public assets in the 
secondary market reached 95% (Balkan & Yeldan, 1996). 
Under these conditions, the stock of domestic debt grew rapidly to reach 20% 
of the GNP by the end of 1995. The interest payments on domestic debt increased 
from 2.4% in 1990, to 6.2% of the GNP in 1995. A critical feature of debt 
accumulation was its extreme short term maturity. By 1992, the state was already 
trapped in a Ponzi-style finance of its debt, with net new government borrowings 
reaching 92% of the outstanding domestic debt. By 1995, this ratio had acceler- 
ated to 132%. 
It is generally well-accepted among students of the Turkish economy that the 
main sources of the crisis can be traced to the culminating pressures of large fiscal 
deficits on the part of the state. In this paper, I attempt to analyse the basic 
underlying processes of the crisis from a political economy perspective of class 
conflict and pressure, along with conflicting interests on income distribution and 
accumulation. T o  this end, the paper employs a 'Computable General Equilib- 
rium' (CGE) model. Utilising the CGE apparatus as an 'economics laboratory', I 
investigate the factors which led to fiscal disequilibrium and finally to the econ- 
omic crisis, through explicit modelling of the strategic behaviour of antagonistic 
social classes in the factor and product markets. 
The plan of the paper is as follows: first, I introduce the salient features of the 































Table 1. Main economic indicators, Turkey 
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400 A. E. Yeldan 
3, I analyse the main socio-economic processes behind this historical path via a 
series of counter-factual simulations. Section 4 summarises and concludes. 
2. The Computable General Equilibrium Model 
2.1. The General Structure and Dimensions 
The CGE model employcd in this study is based on the recent 1990 input-output 
table of the Turkish cconomy published by the State Institute of Statistics (SIS, 
1994) and extended by Kose & Yeldan (1996). It is built around 15 production 
sectors; six socio-economic classes; a central government; and the foreign sector. 
The theoretical structure of the model is based on a general equilibrium framework 
with optimising agents facing endogenous price signals (Dcrvis et a/., 1982), and 
on the structuralist school (Taylor, 1981, 1991; Gibson & van Seventer, 1996; 
Davies & Rattsla, 1996). 
The distinguishing feature of the macro closure utilised in the model is a series 
of macro adjustments on incomc distribution, foreign exchange, and forced savings 
so as to finance a pre-determined level of fiscal expenditures. Within this adjust- 
ment process, the aggregate price level and the nominal exchange rate work 
endogenously to bring equilibrium in the commodity markets. A portion of private 
savings is claimed by the state as forced savings in order to finance its fiscal deficit, 
while any insufficiency of the aggregate domestic funds is closed by alignments in 
the foreign rate of exchange and by foreign transfers. 
A major limitation of the model is its restricted capability to account for the 
generation of financialhentier incomes based on arbitrage possibilities in the 
banking and the financial sectors. Evidence suggests that with extensive liberalisa- 
tion of the financial markets in the late 1980s there has bcen a shift in the 
secondary relations of distribution favouring rentiers and the financial centres (see 
for example, Boratav et al., 1994, 1996; Yeldan, 1995). However, given its micro 
equilibrium structure, the model focuses exclusively on the real sphere of the 
domestic economy. In this setting, the so-called profit income of the financial 
bourgeoisie, as distinguished in the model, is derived from the value added of the 
commercial and financial services sector by deducting wage payments. Thus, the 
financial sources of income can only be captured to the extent that they emanate 
from transactions with the real sectors of the economy. 
Private agents and the public sector are distinguished as two different bodies 
carrying out decisions on savings and the composition of final demand. For both 
categories, savings are generated via fixed saving propensities out of their respect- 
ive disposable incomes. 
The output of each sector is produced by a single representative firm 
employing intermediates and primary inputs. Primary inputs consist of (physical) 
capital and labour. Labour input is further decomposed into two categories: 
organised wage-labour, and informaymarginal labour. Labour demand decisions 
are derived from the marginal productivity conditions of profit maximisation. The 
nominal wage rate of the organised labour is given exogenously, and the organised 
labour market clears through quantity adjustments on employment. Unemployed 
'wage-labour' is pooled with the 'marginal-labour' category where flexible move- 
mcnts of the informal labour wage rate clear the aggregate labour surplus. 
In manufacturing, the final product price is determined by a fixed mark-up 































Sources of the 1994 Turkish Crisis 40 1 
the oligopolistic market power in the sector. In response to increased wage and 
intermediate input costs, the producer secures its level of profits via application of 
the fixed mark-ups, thereby passing increased production costs on to the final 
consumers, inflating the aggregate price level. This mechanism generates an 
important source of structural inflation in the manner described by Taylor (1991) 
and Bourguignon et al., (1991). 
Under the mark-up induced pricing behaviour, market supplies of the manu- 
facturing sectors are determined by endogenous movements of the rate of capacity 
utilisation. The underlying production technology for value added is assumed to 
be Cobb-Douglas, and that of intermediate input use is regarded as Leontieff. In 
this manner, denoting the sectoral use of capital, wage-labour, and informal 
marginal-labour, respectively, by &, Lj, and L,,,j; the intermediate input aggregate 
by K;; the Leontieff coefficients by at; and the capacity utilisation rate by Ui, 
output supply in sector-j becomes, 
In this fashion, under the pre-determined price, product market equilibrium is 
obtained by capacity adjustments, which in turn lead to reduced employment and 
output supply at the sectoral level. 
Private income is generated from value added income, transfers from the 
central government budget, and exogenous transfers from the rest of the world. 
The public disposable income consists of income taxes, tariffs on imports, and the 
production and corporate taxes levied on producers. The public savings rate and 
the aggregate level of public investment are regarded as exogenous policy instru- 
ments. In general, planned public savings fall short of the realised investment 
expenditures; and the public saving-investment deficit (GSIDEF) is covered 
through foreign borrowing (FSAV*ER) plus 'forced' transfers from the private 
savings pool. Price inflation constitutes the major mechanism behind this adjust- 
ment, as it opens a wedge between the ex ante expenditure plans and their 
realisations for the private agents, thereby acting as an implicit tax. This mechan- 
ism entails, on the one hand, excess demand disequilibria in the product markets 
leading to inflationary pressures; and, on the other, leads to real appreciation of the 
domestic currency through induced inflows of foreign borrowing. Thus, the overall 
macro-equilibrium of the domestic economy satisfies: 
GSIDEF = HHSAV - PRINV + FSAV*ER 
where HHSAV-PRINV is private savings surplus over private investment. This 
structure captures quite successfully the recent Turkish reality with culminating 
inflationary pressures; faltering and erratic rates of growth with boom-and-bust 
cycles of real production; and stagnant exports and an unprecedented current 
account deficit accompanied by currency appreciation (in purchase-price-parity 
terms). 
This summarises our discussion of the main attributes and distinguishing 
features of the CGE model.' We now turn to applications in the Turkish historical 































402 A. E. Yeldan 
2.2 Historical Simulations of the Model, 1990-93 
The model tracks the following variables for the period 1990-93: the annual rate 
of domestic inflation, the exchange rate, gross national product and sectoral 
production, wages, employment, fiscal balances, foreign trade transactions, and 
the macro aggregates such as consumption, savings and investment. The values of 
the historically realiscd levels of the variables between 1990 and 1993 are to be 
contrasted below with the model's simulation values in Table 2. 
The three most important prices for our analysis are the overall domestic price 
level, the foreign rate of exchange (TUUSS), and the formal labour wage rate. 
Among these, the first two are solved endogenously by the model, whereas the 
nominal wage rate is regarded as exogenous. The mark-up rates are also treated 
exogenously. Given the data of the Istanbul Chamber of Industry (1995) they are 
adjusted upwards by 10% between 1990 and 199 1, and are held at their respective 
rates for the rest of the period. 
The production values track their historical levels closely, and reproduce the 
value of gross national product both in net factor prices and in producer (market) 
values. The observed discrepancies in the nominal value of GNP are recorded at 
the rate of 2.5% in 1991 and 1992; and at 1.0% in 1993. Components of 
expenditures on the national product are listed in the remaining rows of Table 2, 
where the model's expenditure structure is found to compare closely with the 
historical structure. 
3. Evolution of the Cx4sis and Its Components 
In this section, the 1990-93 simulated growth path will be utilised as a benchmark 
to investigate the 1994 crisis. Three interrelated issues will be considered: (i) the 
role of the unprecedented rise in the fiscal deficit on the evolution of the crisis; (ii) 
the roles of the foreign borrowing strategy of the state on the balance of payments 
and on the foreign exchange rate; and (iii) the inflationary processes emanating 
from real wage increases and oligopolistic pricing behaviour in the industrial 
sectors. 
3.1. Fiscal Balances of the State: experiment El 
Over this period, the most striking indicator over the public sector balances 
pertains to the borrowing requirements of the state. As a ratio of GNP, the PSBR 
increased rapidly from 5.2% in 1990 to reach 7.0% in 1991, and has stabilised at 
that plateau. Concurrently, the volume of public savings deteriorated severely, and 
fell from 3.5% of GNP in 1990, to 0.4% in 1991, and to - 3.5% in 1993. 
In addition, net factor earnings of the public sector fell from their GNP ratio 
of 5% in 1985, to 3.1% in 1990, and to 0.6% in 1991. Revenues from corporate 
taxes also experienced a severe erosion. Their share in the aggregate budgetary 
revenues is observed to decline from its peak of 15% in 1986, to a mere 7% in 
1992. On the other hand, the 1993 value of the current transfers, which has been 
the major expenditure item in the fiscal accounts, exceeded its 1990 level by 75% 
in real terms, amounting to an increase of 8.3-fold in nominal prices. 
Had these adverse developments not occurred in the public sector balances, 
what would the consequences be for the domestic economy? How would the 































Table 2. Model validation of selected macro indicators 
1991 1992 1993 
1990 Model Historical Model Historical Model Historical 
GNP (a) 395.0 649.2 634.4 1132.6 1 103.6 1977.5 1997.3 
GDP (factor prices) (a) 357.1 592.6 607.9 1019.6 1052.6 1794.9 1900.6 
HistoricaYModel GNP 0.977 0.974 1.010 
Composition of GNP (%) 
Public disposable income 14.4 12.5 12.8 11.6 11.8 9.8 9.7 
Public consumption 10.9 12.1 12.3 12.6 12.8 12.9 12.8 
Public savings 3.4 0.4 0.4 - 1.0 - 1.0 - 3.1 - 3.1 
Public investment 8.7 7.3 7.6 6.5 6.5 6.3 6.2 
Public sav-inv deficit 5.2 6.9 7.1 7.5 7.5 9.4 9.3 
Private disposable income 85.6 87.5 87.2 89.4 88.2 90.5 90.3 
Private consumption 66.4 68.7 68.5 67.5 66.5 66.9 66.8 
Private savings 19.3 18.8 18.8 22.0 21.7 23.6 23.5 
Private investment 17.3 14.9 14.8 16.1 15.8 19.3 19.3 
Foreign deficit 3.2 3.0 3.0 1.6 1.6 5.1 5.2 3 
Imports (b) 24.695 23.500 2 1.047 24.800 22.87 1 28.895 29.428 a 
Exports (b) 11.154 1 1.720 13.594 13.495 14.719 14.139 15.348 E 
Price level (c) 100 163 165 277 282 473 470 % 
Exchange rate (TUUSS) 2630 4121 4181 6867 6882 10825 10985 
Wage rate index (d) 100 194 194 300 300 51 1 511 
% 
4 
Sectoral price indexes: 100 'n 'n 
100 158 15 1 276 245 473 398 
Q Agriculture 
Mining 100 162 163 272 262 472 413 2 
Industry 100 176 155 257 253 492 395 3- C. 
Note~:~  SIS New GNP Series, in current trillion TL.b 1990 Billions USSc Consumer price indexd Nominal wage remunerations of insured workers c, 


































1990 1991 1992 1993 
Fig. 1. Domestic inflation rate under experiments El and E2. 
questions will be studied. The counter-factual scenario is designed as follows: first, 
we increase the public savings-GNP ratio to its 1980s average of 4%, from its 
realised value of - 1.3% over 1991-93. We then reduce the annual rate of 
increase of nominal public consumption expenditures from 81% to 45%'. Like- 
wise, the rate of growth of current transfers is reduced to 45% in nominal terms. 
T o  compensate for the revenue losses, net factor earnings of the public sector are 
increased to the 1980s' level of 3% of the GNP. Finally, the erosion of the 
corporate tax revenues is reversed by increasing the corporate tax rate to 15% (its 
average over 1983-87), from its level of 5% of 1990. 
The results are given in Table 3. The simulated rate of inflation (CPI) is 
shown in Fig. 1. Accordingly, under the assumptions of the experiment, the annual 
rate of price increase is calculated to be 30% over the 1990-93 period, down from 
its historically realised rate of 68%. This result is further complemented by positive 
developments in production, where the real GNP increases by 3.5% over its 1993 
value; and in exports, where a 2.9% increase is recorded. Finally, the experimental 
results reveal an annual increase of 22% in the public disposable income in real 
terms, and the public saving-investment gap is reduced by 56.9%. 
Is it possible to make such an isolated assessment of fiscal balances of the 
state, independent of all other historical socio-economic developments of the 
period? In other words, could the Turkish state have replicated the model's 
technical results, which were obtained under a set of exogenous assumptions? This 
question invokes the political economy issues of income distribution and real 
income generation within the private sector. 
Results in Table 3 further suggest that the real income level of industrial 
capital falls by 8.5% in 1991, and by 3.7% in 1993, as compared to its historical 
values. Contraction of the services capital income is even more pronounced with 
a 13.9% reduction by 1993. In a similar vein, rural incomes also suffer a loss of 
3.1%; with the urban-workers the only group to become better off. Consequently, 
under the assumptions of the experiment, while public income improves, private 
capital incomes erode. 
One can underline the experimental results in the following manner: in the 































Table 3. Macroeconomic indicators: experiments E l  and E2 (percentage changes over the historical values) 
GNP 
Foreign deficit 
Public disposable income 
Private disposable income 




















Experiment E l  Experiment E2 































scored rapid increases and the production and export performance of the domestic 
economy faltered, the rapid erosion of the fiscal balances of the state servcd for the 
protection of the urban-capitalist and rural incomes in real terms. The costs of this 
'protection' entailed the rapid surge of the domestic price inflation from its 
possible annual rate of 35% to 68%, and the loss of aggregate gross national 
product by 3.S0/0, and export revenues by 2.9%. At the micro level, this process 
meant administration of an extensive scheme of production subsidies and current 
transfers, and controlling the prices of state enterprises. Consequently, conducive 
conditions could have been generated for the private capital to 'absorb' the rapid 
increases in costs of wage-labour. 
As extensively discussed in Yeldan (1995), the fiscal deficit of the Turkish 
state between 1990 and 1993 does not necessarily imply a problem of 'bureau- 
cratic mis-management' in the abstract; but is a reflection of the administrative and 
socio-economic policies on the part of the public sector, which were deemed 
necessary to sustain the generation of economic surplus for the private capital. The 
state has used its taxation-cum-subsidy policies and the prices (losses) of its 
production enterprises as the strategic instruments of this historical manoeuvre, 
and financed its fiscal deficits via forced savings by way of price inflation and 
increased foreign indebtedness. 
3.2. Foreign Bowowing and Short Term Capital Inflows: experiment E2 
Turkey has liberalised its capital account and declared full convertibility of its 
currency in August 1989. This policy had significant repercussions in the financial 
economy. For the monetary authority it basically meant the loss of control over the 
real rate of interest and the foreign exchange rate as instruments of stabilisation 
policy, as these variables came under the direct scrutiny of the arbitrage opportu- 
nities in the international markets (Uygur, 1994; Balkan & Yeldan, 1996; Boratav 
et al., 1996). 
Beginning in 1990, foreign capital movements were observed to display 
sensitivity with respect to the differential on the rate of interest and foreign 
exchange. The foreign capital inflows in 1990 amounted to US83 billion. In 1993, 
the aggregate amount of foreign capital transferred into the domestic economy 
reached US469.3 billion, or 5.6% of the GNP. 
Thus, in this period the foreign capital inflows served the dual function of 
covering the public sector deficits as well as expanding the import capacity of the 
domestic economy. The state was able to finance its deficits through borrowing at 
high interest rates, which, in turn, stimulated the financial (speculative) capital 
inflows. Yet the costs of this fragile equilibrium were reflected on the traded 
sectors as a consequence of currency appreciation and faltering export demand. As 
a version of this 'Dutch Disease' phenomenon spread, imports expanded rapidly, 
and the ratio of exports to imports fell to 0.52 in 1993, from its 1989 value of 0.74. 
The purpose of this experiment is to examine the following question: 'What 
would the inflationary consequences and the macro balances be, had the possibil- 
ities of foreign capital inflows been restricted in the 1990s?'. T o  this end, the 
experiment imposes zero net foreign borrowing and foreign transfers to the 
economy throughout the 1991-93 period. All other factors, which were regarded 
as exogenous under the historical base-simulation-such as the fiscal deficits, real 
wage increases, etc-are kept intact. The analysis of this experiment is based on 































Sources of the 1994 Turkish Crisis 407 
Experiment E2 A 
I I I 
1990 1991 1992 1993 
Years 
Fig. 2. Exchange rate, experiments El and E2. 
The elimination of foreign capital transfers into the economy has inflationary 
consequences, increasing the annual rate of increase of consumer prices to 84%. 
In the meantime, as compared with the 1993 levels, the gross national product falls 
by 9.6%; and the private sector real disposable income and consumption fall by 
10.9%. Thus, under the assumptions of experiment E2, the domestic economy 
drifts into real contraction and price inflation. 
Results on factor income, as displayed in Table 3, further complement this 
picture, indicating large losses for the private sector. In comparison with end-of- 
1993 values, industrial-capitalist incomes decline by 4.5%; industrial labour 
incomes by 16%, and the rural incomes by 6.8%. 
Figure 2 portrays the path of the nominal rate of foreign exchange. Elimin- 
ation of foreign capital inflows naturally leads to depreciation of the currency in 
order to equilibrate the balance of payments accounts. Accordingly, the equilib- 
rium nominal exchange rate reaches 21 816 TU$ in 1993, as compared to its 
realised rate of 10 825 TU$.  However, under experiment E l ,  reduction of the 
fiscal deficits results in deflation of the price level and appreciation of the currency. 
Not surprisingly, the major consequence of currency appreciation of the 
post-1 989 period was stagnation of the overall export performance, together with 
the massive expansion of imports. Thus, foreign liberalisation and the consequent 
capital inflows served to cover the deficits of the public sector on the one hand, 
and stimulated the consumption propensities of the private sector, on the other. 
Yet this short-lived invigoration did not lead to a sustainable expansion of real 
production, and was met by increased imports. This mechanism, which was based 
on a fragile balance between the rates of domestic interest and the foreign 
exchange, collapsed by the end of 1993, leading to financial chaos and to a severe 
contraction of the real GNP in the months to follow. 
3.3. Wage Costs and the Oligopolistic Market Behaviour: experiments 3 and 4 
In many popular writings, wage costs are regarded as the main source of price 
inflation in the Turkish economy. However, the existing data are far from 
providing support for this claim. Observations on the quantitative indicators do 































408 A. E. Yeldan 
0 1 I I I 
1990 1991 1992 1993 
Years 
Fig. 3. Wages, oligopolistic pricing and domestic inflation. 
are to be found in wage costs. T o  analyse this hypothesis in a more formal manner, 
we will study both the cost-push and the demand-creation effects of wage 
increases in our general equilibrium framework under experiment E3. Under this 
experiment, real wages are kept constant at their 1990 level, and all other public 
sector variables are set to their previously assumed levels. However, anticipating 
the expected cost savings on the public employee wage bill, I treat the aggregate 
public consumption expenditures item as endogenous along the experiment. With 
this technical change in the closure rule of the model, aggregate public employ- 
ment in the public services sector is regarded as a given constant; thereby decreases 
in the wage costs reduce the public consumption expenditures on a direct bask3 
The simulated inflation rate under these assumptions is displayed in Fig. 3. 
Maintenance of the real wage rate at its 1990 level results in a reduction of the 
1993 value of the consumer price index from 473 points, to 409 index points (with 
the price index set equal to 100 in 1990), lowering the average annual rate of price 
inflation by 8 percentage points to 60°/o over the period 1990-93. 
Here, an important issue is related to the role of the profit margins in setting 
cost dynamics. In discussions about the 'cost-push' aspects of price inflation, 
current debates generally focus solely on the wage-costs of labour, ignoring the 
pressures emanating form the profittrent recipients. Yet, oligopolistic pricing 
strategies based on independent mark-ups over average variable costs are observed 
to be a common feature of price formation in the Turkish manufacturing sectors. 
Under this mechanism, the economic returns to the capitalist are effectively 
protected by way of mark-ups, and the increases in costs are directly reflected onto 
the final consumers via price adjustments. 
Such oligopolistic pressures on price dynamics are analysed through the 
simulation of experiment E4, and are further to be contrasted with the results 
obtained under E3. Figure 3 discloses that, under the 'competitive' pricing 
configuration, the implemented cost savings on real wages generate a further 
reduction of 5 percentage points in the annual rate of inflation, dampening the rate 
of growth of producer prices to 55%. In other words, experiment E4 suggests that 
the mark-up based oligopolistic pricing strategy in the manufacturing sector has 








































Fig. 4. Wages and oligopolistic profits in the manufacturing industry. 
economy. Confronted with rising wage-costs, industrialists could have sustained 
their profits by inflating the final prices of the products they supply and thus have 
led to a process I will refer to as 'profidrent induced inflation'. 
This technical analysis is portrayed in Fig. 4, where the evolution of the profit 
income against the real wage movements is contrasted under the (historical) 
oligopolistic versus the (hypothetical) competitive pricing environments. The 
figure plots the historically realised wage rate changes, admitting an increase to the 
index (1990 = 100) level of 119 in 1991, and stabilising at 108.2 in 1993. The 
historical simulation path on profits reveals that 'oligopolistic profits' follow the 
real wage path, maintaining the real rate of return to capital. Per contra, had the 
capital-owner faced the real wage increases under a competitive configuration, the 
profit rates would have fallen and the consequent price inflation would have been 
lower. 
This process is displayed at the sectoral level in Table 4. Under the 'historical' 
column, against the real wage index increases of 108.2, the average manufacturing 
real profit index reaches 116.2 points. Thus, the model solutions suggest that, 
under the 'historical' simulation, assuming a value of 1.0 in 1990, the profitlwage 
ratio increases to 2.291 in 1993. Under the oligopolistic conditions of E3, 
elimination of real wage increases leads the aggregate profit index to reach 11 7.4 
points. However, under the competitive setting of experiment E4, one would 
expect the index of (competitive) profits to be 105.2, and the price index to be 
pulled down to 376 index points. 
The macro consequences of experiments E3 and E4 are displayed in Table 5. 
One of the most interesting observations of experiment E3 is that elimination of 
real wage increases brings forth a 0.2% decline in GNP as compared to its 1993 
historical level. Per contra, under the same wage assumptions, but with a compet- 
itive pricing environment of E4, gross national product is observed to increase by 
1 .O% over its 1993 value. Hence, a comparison of E3 and E4 suggests that the 
economic costs of oligopolistic pricing behaviour in Turkish manufacturing are not 
































Table 4. Real wages, profits and capacity utilisation in the manufacturing industry, experiments E3 and E4 
Historical Experiment E3 Experiment E4 
1990 1991 1993 1991 1993 1991 1993 
Real wage index 100.0 119.0 108.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Average profit rate index 100.0 106.5 116.1 108.5 117.4 100.7 105.2 
Profitlwage ratio (a) 1 .OOO 2.303 2.291 2.302 2.265 2.297 2.264 
Average capacity utilisation rate 100.0 96.5 93.3 94.1 92.3 100.0 100.0 































Table 5. Macroeconomic indicators: experiments E3 and E4 (percentage changes over the historical 
solution values) 
Experiment E3 Experiment E4 
1991 1992 1993 1991 1992 1993 
GNP 
Foreign deficit 
Public disposable income 
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4. Summary and Conclusions 
In this study I have investigated the post-1990 evolution of the Turkish economy 
within a structuralist macro-economic model, which is utilised as a 'social labora- 
tory' to analyse a series of 'counter-factual' policy environments so as to 
disintegrate the underlying mechanisms behind the 1994 crisis. 
The counter-factual policy simulations of the model reveal the importance of 
the public sector fiscal deficits as a major factor generating inflationary dynamics 
in the Turkish economy. However, the model solutions also underscore the crucial 
function of the state in sustaining and re-distributing capitalist incomes in response 
to the intensified conflicting claims on national income through the 1990s. At the 
micro level, the state is observed to interfere with the domestic commodity markets 
through an extensive scheme of production subsides and current transfers, and 
through effective price controls on the state enterprises which strategically produce 
mostly intermediate inputs in an attempt to generate cost-savings to the private 
capital. Through this process, conducive conditions could have been generated for 
the private capital to 'absorb' the rapid increases in labour costs of the late 1980s. 
The role of foreign capital inflows was the second issue analysed with the aid 
of the model. With full capital account liberalisation in 1989, Turkey received 
significant foreign inflows of short term capital, which were attracted by the 
arbitrage differential between high domestic real interest rates and the appreciated 
foreign exchange rate. Under the experiment, this process was reversed and the 
foreign borrowing was set to zero in net terms. It was found that the foreign capital 
inflows served to postpone the evolving economic crisis by providing timely 
financial resources to the public sector to (partially) cover its growing deficits. 
Furthermore, by stimulating the private consumption demand, they generated 
short term growth sparks for the economy. Yet the fragile balance upon which this 
mechanism rested was clearly not sustainable, and its collapse at the end of 1993 
meant a severe contraction in real output and financial chaos. 
The experiment, which analyses the effects of real wage increases on price 
inflation, reveals that, by keeping the real wages at their 1990 level, the reduction 
in the inflation rate can be expected to lie between 4% and 8%. This would 
depend on whether wage reductions will have direct cost savings on public 
expenditures. However, these abstract results of the experiment do not take 
account of the pressures emanating from the oligopolistic pricing behaviour 
prevalent in the manufacturing industry. In this regard, the simulation results 
reveal that the mark-up based oligopolistic pricing strategies in manufacturing have 
both inflationary and contractionary consequences for the domestic economy. 
In conclusion, based on the political economy perspective of class conflict and 
political pressure, the current model underscores the fact that conflicting claims of 
various social classes on national output have to be regarded as important sources 
of disequilibria in the domestic economy; and that the erosion of fiscal balances of 
the public sector is but a mere reflection of the state's intervention in the factor 
and the product markets in an attempt to resolve the distributional conflict in 
favour of capital, during a period of real wage increases and faltering production 
and trade performance. 
Notes 
A previous version of the paper (Economic Development Center Bulletin No. 95-2) was drafted when 
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1. 171e full algebraic system of equations of the model are given in Yeldan (1995) 'Political economy 
perspectives on the 1994 Turkish economic crisis: a CGE modeling analysis'. University of 
Minnesota, Economic Development Center Bulletin, No. 95-1. 
2. Note that given the endogenous specification of the price level, one can exogenously parameterise 
only the nominal values of such macro aggregates. Based on the model's simulation results, it can be 
calculated that this amounts to an average real increase of approximately 10% over the historically 
realised path. 
3. Experiment E3 effectively distinguishes aggregate public consumption (GDTOT) into two cate- 
gories: wage costs of public employees (Wpu"*Lpurt), and non-labour public expenditures 
(GDNONPER). Here, the model continues to regard GDNONPER as exogenously given in real 
1990 prices. Experiment E3, reduces the rate of increase of real Wpull to zero, and, by fixing the 
aggregate employment of public employees, Lpuu, achieves savings in the public wage bill. If, per 
contra, LPUH were continued to be regarded as an endogenous entity, declining wage rates would 
have expanded employment at the public sector, without any significant savings in total wage costs. 
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